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GIFFEN H. OTT*

Departure from the Surface
Destruction Test for the Allocation
of "Other Minerals" in Texas
Courts have struggled for years to determine what is included in a
conveyance' of specifically enumerated substances and "other minerals." 2
Although mineral grants or reservations generally include broad terminology to indicate the inclusion of more than those minerals specifically
named, 3 the meaning of this terminology has often been unclear. Long
after a conveyance has been made, problems of ascertaining the meaning
of "other minerals" may arise when both the mineral estate owner and
the surface- estate owner claim ownership of a mineral not specifically
enumerated in the initial instrument. As unanticipated economic and technological developments raise new substances to commercial importance,
the original agreements are often interpreted in contexts which the parties
could not have foreseen at the time of conveyance. Under these conditions, court decisions may allocate tremendous unanticipated benefits or
impose tremendous unanticipated costs upon either of the parties to a
transaction.
In Moser v. United States Steel Corp.,' the Texas Supreme Court has
announced a new rule for the allocation of "other minerals" in Texas.
The decision marks a striking departure from the surface destruction test,
a test which the court had recently reaffirmed and reformulated.5 Under
the earlier rule, in the absence of an affirmative expression to the contrary,
the term "mineral" in a conveyance did not include any substance for
which a reasonable method of extraction could destroy or deplete the
surface estate.6 In Moser, the court has departed from the surface de*B.B.A. Southern Methodist University; J.D., Stanford University expected 1986.
1. The term "conveyance" is used in this article to include any grant, reservation, exception, or
devise.
2. For a survey of holdings regarding various specific substances and various jurisdictions, see
generally I H. WILLLAMs & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 219 (rev. perm. ed. 1984).
3. The words used in such expressions vary considerably. See, e.g., Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d
169, 170 (Tex. 1977) ("all oil, gas and other minerals on and under ... "), affd after remand,
597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980); Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 575,
136 S.W.2d 800, 803 (1940) ("all Minerells Paint Rock &c. [sic] found or will be found on...");
Luse v. Boatman, 217 S.W. 1096 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1919, writ ref'd) ("coal and minerals
in and of...").
4. 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984).
5. The court's most recent reformulation was in Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980).
6. See id. at 747.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 26

struction test by holding that "title to uranium is held by the owner of
the mineral estate as a matter of law." 7
The new rule is a response to the difficulties inherent in the application
of prior formulations,' but, while it clarifies the ownership of uranium,
its impact upon the ownership of other minerals is unclear. This article
retraces the history of the Texas Supreme Court's endeavor to allocate
unspecified minerals. It then explores the Moser decision and the scope
of its impact upon the determination of who owns "other minerals" in
Texas. Finally, it concludes with suggestions for improving the efficiency
and fairness of the determination so as to move the allocation closer to
these objectives.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SURFACE DESTRUCTION TEST
FOR THE DETERMINATION OF OWNERSHIP
OF UNSPECIFIED MINERALS IN TEXAS
It is well established in Texas that the mineral estate may be severed
from the surface estate by deed or lease. 9 As owner of the dominant
estate, the mineral owner or lessee generally has the implied right to use
freely so much of the surface as is reasonably and necessarily incident
to the removal of his or her property.'O The dominant tenant's use of the
surface property must be made with due regard for the rights of the surface
estate owner or lessee," but the mineral estate owner is generally liable
to the surface tenant only for damages that arise from excessive or negligent use of the surface.' 2 Determinations of reasonableness or necessity
in connection with the removal of a substance from a lease may not seem
especially troublesome where the substance is specifically enumerated in
the conveyance, or where the use in question is one which should have
7. 676 S.W.2d at 101.
8. See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
9. See Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 101; Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, 233-34, 176 S.W.
717, 718-19 (1915). See also Reed, 597 S.W.2d at 747; Humphreys-Mexia Co. v. Gammon, 113
Tex. 247, 250, 254 S.W. 296, 299 (1923).
10. Ball v. Dillard, 602 S.W.2d 521, 523 (Tex. 1980); Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d
808, 810 (Tex. 1972); Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. 1971).
11. See Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d at 621; Brown v. Lundell, 162 Tex. 84, 87, 344
S.W.2d 863, 866 (1961). Cf. Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d at 817 (Daniel, J., dissenting)
(discussing trend toward conciliation of conflicts and accommodation between the mineral and surface
estates). A variant of the effort to accommodate the enjoyment of the surface estate is the doctrine
of available alternative means. Where reasonable alternative means are available to the dominant
tenant on the premises and those means place less of a burden on the surface estate than other
alternatives, those means must be used. Getty, 470 S.W.2d at 622-23. See also Sui 0il,483 S.W.2d
at 812 (limiting application of the doctrine to alternatives available on the subject premises).
12. Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 103; see Sun Oil v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d at 810; Brown v. Lundell,
162 Tex. at 86, 344 S.W.2d at 865.
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been contemplated by the parties;13 however, the problem grows more
complex when unnamed substances are involved or unanticipated mining
techniques might leave the surface estate substantially destroyed.' 4 The
surface destruction test may be viewed as an effort to avoid the unexpected
imposition of such a burden upon the servient estate.
Heinatz v. Allen: Ordinary and Natural Meaning of "Mineral"
In Heinatz v. Allen,' 5 the Texas Supreme Court acknowledged the
importance of a substance's relationship to the surface of the land and
the method and effect of its removal.' 6 The instrument at issue severed
"the surface rights exclusive of the mineral rights" and "the mineral
rights" of a tract which contained substantial quantities of limestone near
its surface. 7 In deciding that the limestone was part of the surface estate,
the court examined the nature of limestone, its relationship to the surface
of the land, its use and value, and the method and effect of its removal."
The scientific or technical definition of "minerals" was rejected for such
a broad definition would have encompassed "not only metallic minerals,
oil, gas, stone, sand, gravel, and many other substances, but even the
soil itself."' 9 Instead the court held that the words "the mineral rights"
were to be interpreted according to their "ordinary and natural meaning. '"20 In its opinion, substances such as sand, gravel, and limestone
were not minerals within the ordinary and natural meaning of the word
unless they were rare and exceptional in character or unless they possessed
a peculiar property giving them special value.2' Because the limestone at
issue was located at or near the surface, the court found it to be so closely
related to the soil as to be reasonably and ordinarily considered a part of
13. But see, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d at 812-13 (Daniel, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the implied easement doctrine does not provide for the consumption or depletion of the surface
estate in connection with extraordinary or secondary recovery methods, and that water flooding is
not an ordinary primary production method).
14. Cf. Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 102-03 (distinguishing between the dominant tenant's responsibilities to the surface owner for damages caused by the extraction of a specified substance and those
caused by the extraction of an unspecified substance); Clark, UraniumProblems, 18 TEx. B.J. 505,
536-38 (1955) (arguing that the central issue in a dispute over uranium ore between a surface owner
and an oil and gas lessee is the difference between oil and gas production methods and hard mineral
mining operations).
15. 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949).
16. Id. at 515, 518, 217 S.W.2d at 995-96, 997-98.
17. Id. at 514, 217 S.W.2d at 995.
18. Id. at 515, 217 S.W.2d at 995-98.
19. Id. at 517, 217 S.W.2d at 997.
20. Id. at 518, 217 S.W.2d at 997.
21. Id. at 518, 217 S.W.2d at 997. The court went on to suggest that limestone which could be
used for the manufacture of cement may possess such a special value, but this suggestion was later
rejected in Atwood v. Rodman, 355 S.W.2d 206, 213 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1962, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) cited vith approval in Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. 1971).
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the soil itself.22 The court supported its conclusion by noting that the
limestone was recoverable only by the open-pit method and that such a
fact, considered along with others, was relevant towards determining that
a substance was not included in a conveyance or reservation of minerals.'
Although the court had previously addressed the issue of whether or
not the term "minerals" encompassed oil and gas,24 Heinatz represented
the Texas Supreme Court's first effort towards determining whether a
hard mineral near the surface of a tract was included among the unspecified
minerals conveyed to the mineral estate.' The object of the court's "ordinary and natural meaning" rule was to effectuate what it perceived as
the intent of the parties to an ordinary mineral conveyance. 26 Although
several site-specific factual issues were left open to dispute,27 the case
strongly implied that, absent unusual circumstances or a clear expression
of intent to the contrary, substances such as sand, gravel, and limestone
were not to be considered part of the mineral estate.
Acker v. Guinn: Origin of the Surface DestructionTest
In Acker v. Guinn,25 the Texas Supreme Court adhered to consideration
of the same criteria it had used earlier in Heinatz,29 but it shifted its
primary emphasis toward the effect that extraction of the unspecified
22. 147 Tex. at 518, 217 S.W.2d at 997.
23. Id. at 518-19, 217 S.W.2d at 998.
24. See, e.g., Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 581-84, 136 S.W.2d
800, 804-05 (1940) (holding that "all Minerells Paint Rock &c [sic] includes oil and gas"); Rio
Bravo Oil Co. v. McEntire, 128 Tex. 124, 127-33, 95 S.W.2d 381, 383-84 ("coal, mineral, stone,
or any other valuable deposits" held to include oil and gas), reh'g on other issue, 96 S.W.2d 1110
(1936); Elliot v. Nelson, 113 Tex. 62, 70-71, 251 S.W. 501, 504 (1923) ("all minerals in, upon,
and under the said land" held to include oil and gas).
25. Cf. 147 Tex. at 520-21, 217 S.W.2d at 999 (distinguishing the only other "other mineral"
cases which had been decided by the court on the basis that those decisions only addressed whether
"minerals" included oil or gas). The Texas Supreme Court had previously denied writ on two Court
of Civil Appeals decisions which it cited with approval in Heinatz. Id. at 522-23, 217 S.W.2d at
1000. In both Psenick v. Wessels, 205 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, writ ref'd) and
Winsett v. Watson, 206 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, writ ref'd), the courts held
that sand and gravel were not included within the term "minerals."
26. Cf. Heinatz, 147 Tex. at 517, 217 S.W.2d at 997 (stating that the words "the mineral rights"
are to be interpreted according to their ordinary and natural meaning because this gives effect to the
intention of the testatrix, who is presumed to have been familiar with the ordinary and natural
meaning of the words used in her will). See also id. at 518, 217 S.W.2d at 998 (stating that the
fact that the limestone was recoverable only by the open pit method further supports the conclusion
that the words "the mineral rights" were not intended to include the rights to limestone).
27. For example, a mineral estate owner might have argued that a substance under dispute
possessed peculiar qualities, had an extraordinary or special value, or that the reserves were deep
and extractable with little disturbance to the surface. See supra notes 18, 21-23 and accompanying
texts.
28. 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
29. Compare supra text accompanying note 18 with 464 S.W.2d 348.
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substance would have upon the surface estate.3" At issue in Acker was
whether the words "all of the oil, gas and other minerals" encompassed
iron ore.3 ' Upon review of the record, the court found that the ore was
a mineral within the technical meaning of the word and that it had some,
but not extraordinary, commercial value.32 The ore deposits were at or
near the surface of the tract and could only be mined by the open pit
method, resulting in substantial destruction of the surface.3 3 While acknowledging that the mineral estate was dominant and that its owner
could make such use of the surface as was reasonably necessary, the court
argued that it was not "ordinarily contemplated" that the utility of the
surface for agricultural or grazing purposes would be destroyed or substantially impaired. Accordingly, the court set forth the following rule as
dispositive of the case: "Unless the contrary intention is affirmatively and
fairly expressed, . . . a grant or reservation of 'minerals' or 'mineral
rights' should not be construed to include a substance that must be removed by methods that will, in effect, consume or deplete the surface
estate. ""
In reaching its conclusion, the court expressly rejected application of
the rule of ejusdem generis to "minerals." 35 Accepting in part the approach of Professor Eugene Kuntz, a6 the court perceived that it was a
30. After determining that the ore was a mineral in the technical sense, that it had some commercial
value, and that it was found at or near the surface, the court identified the primary issue as whether
a grant or reservation of 'minerals' included minerals that were recoverable only by open-pit mining.
464 S.W.2d at 351-52.
31. 464 S.W.2d at 349.
32. See id. at 350. Specifically, the court noted that the ore had a definite chemical composition
and that, although it was inadequate when used alone for the production of pig iron, it was used
over the years as a foundation base in road construction. Although the court indicated that the nature
of the substance and commercial value were prerequisite to the surface destruction test, one may
reasonably conclude that these requirements were of minimal importance. For example, substances
such as oil and gas are not technically minerals, Clark, supra note 14, at 534, yet they have been
held to be within the meaning of the word. See, e.g., Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer,
134 Tex. 574, 581-84, 136 S.W.2d 800, 804-09 (1940); Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. McEntire, 128 Tex.
124, 127-33, 95 S.W.2d 381, 383-84, reh'g on otherissue, 96 S.W.2d 1110 (1936); Elliot v. Nelson,
113 Tex. 62, 70-71, 251 S.W. 501 (1923). One may also reasonably conclude that few disputes
will be litigated over substances that have no commercial value.
33. 464 S.W.2d at 351. The court noted that at least one commentator had suggested that hardmineral mining conducted by the sinking of shafts or tunnels might also result in destruction of the
surface through the deposit of tailings and other waste, but it declined to rule on that issue. Id.
(citing Clark, supra note 14, at 505).
34. Id. at 352.
35. Id. at 350. The difficulty with the rule lies in the determination of which characteristics of
the substances specifically named are relevant for defining the general term; for example, coal is
like oil and gas in that it is a hydrocarbon used for energy, but it is different in its manner of
extraction. See Note, Beneath the Surface-Destruction Test: The Dialectic of Intention and Policy,
56 TEx. L. REV. 99, 101 (1977).
36. 464 S.W.2d at 352 (citing with approval Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming,
3 Wyo. J.L. 107, 112 (1949)).
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mistake to attempt to discover and give effect to an intention to include
or exclude a specific substance when the parties in fact had no such
specific intent.37 Kuntz acknowledged that an intention test was appropriate, but he disagreed with its application to specific substances. 3" He
argued that the intention sought should be the "general intent," rather
than any supposed but unexpressed "specific intent," and that it could
be reasonably assumed that the parties intended to sever the entire mineral
estate from the surface estate. Kuntz reached this assumption by considering what he perceived to be the purposes of the grant or reservation in
terms of the manner of enjoyment of the ensuing interests.39 The court
agreed with this portion of the Kuntz analysis' and concluded that it
would not be "ordinarily contemplated" that the term "minerals" would
37. 464 S.W.2d at 352.
38. See Kuntz, supra note 36, at 112.
39. Id. Professor Kuntz concluded that:
Applying this intention, the severance should be construed to sever from the surface
all substances presently valuable in themselves, apart from the soil, whether their
presence is known or not, and all substances which become valuable through development of the arts and sciences, and that nothing presently or prospectively valuable
as extracted substances would be intended to be excluded from the mineral estate.
A limitation upon the mineral estate should be that only those substances can be
removed without compensation which can be removed without unreasonable injury to
the enjoyment of the surface estate, i.e. without unreasonably interfering with the uses
for which the land is adapted. To this extent, the surface and mineral estates are not
only mutually dominant, but are also mutually servient estates. The surface estate is
burdened with the right of access, and the mineral estate is burdened with the right
of the surface owner to insist that the surface be left intact and that it not be rendered
valueless for the purposes for which it is adapted, by depletion of sub-surface or surface
substances.
Id. at 113. Since the enjoyment of oil and gas is not necessary to and does not destroy the enjoyment
of the surface, oil and gas should be considered within a general grant or reservation of minerals.
Id.
40. Although the court purported to endorse the basic approach taken by Professor Kuntz, substantial departures from the original approach were made. See Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 177
(Tex. 1977) (Daniel, J., dissenting) (noting the court's failure to recognize the qualifications described
below as limits Kuntz placed upon his approach). The analysis relied upon by the court was devoted
to identifying what substances should be included in a general conveyance of minerals, and, specifically, whether oil and gas should be included in such a conveyance. Kuntz, supra note 36, at
108-14. Kuntz placed a limitation upon this analysis where substances were specifically enumerated:
Since minerals may be severed piece-meal, i.e. both as to type and location, if the
language of the instrument indicates a specific intention to do so, then that intention
must be given full effect. For example, where the purposes of the grant indicate that
a specific type of mineral was intended to be covered, or where there is an enumeration
of certain minerals having characteristics in common followed by "etc.," or where
the description of the rights of removal are sufficiently specific to indicate that only a
certain character of mineral was intended to be covered, then, in such cases, there is
a specific intent present and it is expressed, although perhaps not with the desired
clarity. In all other cases, i.e. where no specific intent can be found, the general
intention to sever all substances valuable in themselves should be given effect.
Id. at 114. Along with the common method of extraction used for oil and gas, Kuntz would presumably
use other clauses from a typical or "Producers' 88" oil and gas lease to exclude solid minerals from
the mineral estate. For example, the usual provisions for the burying of pipelines at certain depths
or keeping operations at specified distances from surface improvements might be probative. See
Clark, supra note 14, at 537.
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convey a substance the extraction of which would effectively destroy the
surface and the opportunity for its enjoyment.41
Reed v. Wylie: Restatements of the Surface Destruction Test
The principal query in the Reed v. Wylie decisions42 concerned whether
interests in coal or lignite were included in a reservation of an undivided
interest in "all oil, gas, and other minerals." 43 On the first appeal of Reed
(Reed 1), the Texas Supreme Court expressly affirmed Acker and held
that the Acker rule was dispositive," but the court also elaborated upon
the rule and added requirements pertaining to matters not at issue in the
earlier decision.
Two new requirements were the most relevant.45 First, the court declared that Acker did not favor the surface owner merely because he or
she could show that it was possible to extract a substance through strip
or open-pit mining: "Instead, the surface estate owner must prove that,
as of the date of the instrument being construed, if the substance near
the surface had been extracted, that extraction would necessarily have
consumed or depleted the land surface. "' Second, the court declared that
if the substance at issue was "at the surface of the land," no further proof
would be required to establish the title of the surface owner to the substance.47 The court also indicated that, even if a substance did not lie "at
the surface," evidence of the depth of a deposit might adequately show
that extraction would necessarily destroy the surface.48
41. 464 S.W.2d at 352.
42. 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Reed I] afd after remand, 597 S.W.2d
743 (Tex. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Reed I1]. The Texas Supreme Court issued its first opinion on
the case on May 25, 1977. 20 TEx. Sup. Cr. J. 327, 329 (May 25, 1977), withdrawn and replaced
by 554 S.W.2d 169 (1977). For discussion of the differences between the two versions of Reed !,
see infra note 51.
43. Reed !, 554 S.W.2d at 170.
44. 554 S.W.2d at 170, 171.
45. See Reed II, 597 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Tex. 1980). Under the agreed facts in Acker, the controverted ore deposits outcropped on the surface and had to be mined by open-pit or strip-mining
methods, 464 S.W.2d at 351; therefore, the subjects of the two new requirements were not at issue.
46. Reed!, 554 S.W.2d at 172 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 173.
48. Cf. id. (noting that the record failed to prove the depth at which the lignite was located "so
as to show that the extraction of the lignite would have necessarily removed or destroyed the surface
of the land"). One sentence of the dicta in the opinion could even be interpreted to imply that
proximity to the surface was a specific requirement under Reed . Cf. 554 S.W.2d at 173 (in response
to the suggestion that there was shaft mining of lignite in the area prior to the date of the 1950 deed,
the court states, "This fact would have no effect if lignite were located at or near the surface of the
land being conveyed and if in 1950 this shallow lignite would have been extracted only by a method
that would have destroyed the surface of the land"). But the remainder of the opinion indicates that
the proximity of the substance to the surface is merely probative of whether extraction would
necessarily destroy the surface. See, e.g., Reed 1I, 597 S.W.2d at 748 (stating that Reed I did not
require that a deposit outcrop or be at the surface of the particular tract in question, but noting that
the language of Reed I was subject to the contrary interpretation). Contra Note, Abandonment of
the Surface Destruction Test in Determining Ownership of Unnamed Minerals: Moser v. United
States Steel Corp., 15 TEx. TEcH. L. REv. 699, 705 (1984).
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The court explained several other aspects of the Acker rule. For example, it emphasized that the Acker test conclusively determined the
ownership of the substance at issue at all depths, not only those accessible
through strip or pit mining.49 The rule did not horizontally divide ownership of the substance between the two estates. Furthermore, upon a
showing that the extraction of a substance would have been destructive,
any showing that devices of restoration or reclamation would have been
available would be immaterial. 50 The actual intention or knowledge of
the parties would also be immaterial, as would be the value of the substance, either on the date of the instrument or at any subsequent date. 5
In summary, the refined rule as set forth by Reed I may be stated as
follows:
In the absence of an affirmative expression to the contrary, the term
"mineral" in an instrument of conveyance does not include any part
of a substance at any depth if there exist on the property substantial
quantities of the substance the extraction of which would, at the date
of the conveyance, necessarily have consumed or depleted the land. 2
Although Reed I gave the supreme court an opportunity to elaborate
upon its surface destruction test, the same opportunity would soon present
itself again. The record before the court in Reed I failed to prove the
depth at which the lignite at issue was located or that extraction of the
substance would necessarily have destroyed the surface.53 Accordingly,
the appellant's motion for summary judgment was denied and the case
was remanded to the trial court.
Separate concurring and dissenting opinions in Reed I raised some of
the problems of the decision which would become evident in the ensuing
years. Chief Justice Greenhill concurred with the majority's determination
of the inadequacy of the summary judgment proof as to the depth of the
lignite, but he disagreed with the majority's requirement that the surface
49. 554 S.W.2d at 172. The court acknowledged that it could have construed the conveyance in
Acker to vest ownership of all ore in the mineral owner and allowed the problem of minerals lying
near the surface to be met by limiting the implied easement of the mineral owner, but this was not
the holding of Acker. The substance which could be extracted only by substantial destruction of the
surface was to be owned by the surface owner. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. The value of the substance at issue was of some importance in the supreme court's first
opinion. There the court held that a surface destructive method was a necessity if surface mining
was the only "commercially feasible" method of extraction and there were "commercially producible
quantities" of the substance at the date of conveyance. 20 Tax. Sup. CT. J. 327, 329 (May 25,
1977), withdrawn and replaced by 554 S.W.2d 169 (1977). Although the court retained the date of
conveyance requirement in its second opinion, 554 S.W.2d at 172, it omitted the commerciality
requirements in favor of requiring that extraction "would necessarily have consumed or depleted"
the surface and that "substantial quantities" of the substance existed. Id.
52. Reed 1, 554 S.W.2d at 173.
53. Id.
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owner show that extraction would have necessarily destroyed the surface.' Although he agreed that the instrument should be construed as of
the date of its execution, he would have allowed the surface owner to
prevail upon showing that any reasonable method of production would
have destroyed or depleted the surface estate.55
Justice Daniel delivered a vigorous dissenting opinion. 6 The dissent
agreed with Chief Justice Greenhill that the surface owner should not be
required to bear the onerous burden of proving that a substance could
only be mined by a surface destructive method. Accordingly, the dissent
would have held Acker to apply only to near-surface coal and lignite
which could be mined and removed by open-pit or strip mining methods.57
But based upon the premise that the parties contemplated that the integrity
of the surface would be protected from destruction by any and all methods
of extraction, the dissent saw no reason to limit consideration of the
means available for extraction to the time of the deed. 58 As the dissent
saw it, the controlling principle in Acker was the ore's
5 9 existence so near
the surface that it formed a part of the surface itself.
The dissent argued that the factual issues inherent in the majority's
approach would lead to title uncertainty and inequitable results.' As an
alternative, the dissent suggested that coal and lignite should be held
outside of a conveyance of "all oil, gas and other minerals" for the simple
reason that neither was specifically enumerated and "other minerals" was
"obviously" applicable only to "oil and gas related minerals" which
could be extracted through a well bore.6
Reed v. Wylie (Reed 1)62 provided the supreme court with another
54. Id. (Greenhill, C.J., concurring).
55. Id. Following the reasoning of Acker, the former Chief Justice concluded that a surface owner
would not intend to convey away any unnamed substance as a "mineral" when any reasonable
method of producing the substance would destroy or deplete his or her estate. Id. at 174. It should
be noted that, had the doctrine of available alternative means or an analogous protectionary doctrine,
see supra note 10 and accompanying text, been employed in conjunction with the majority's "necessity" rule so that alternatives would have been evaluated as of the date of the instrument's
execution, then the surface owner would only need to show that surface mining techniques were
the only reasonable alternative if she sought to acquire title to a controverted substance. She would
only need to allow the mineral estate owner to show that other mining techniques were reasonably
available in order to protect the surface from destruction. These doctrines have not been extended
to such situations as of yet, but the potential exists for doing so. Recognition of this latent feature
of the majority's approach somewhat undermines the rationale here used by the former Chief Justice.
56. 554 S.W.2d at 174. Justice Daniel actually wrote two dissenting opinions to Reed I, the latter
of which was an addendum written after the majority's first Reed I opinion was withdrawn and
replaced. He was joined in both dissents by Justice Steakley.
57. Id. at 174-75.
58. Id. at 181.
59. Id. at 175, 181.
60. Id. at 178-79.
61. Id. at 175.
62. 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980).
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opportunity to reevalute its surface destruction test and respond to the
challenges offered by Justice Daniel's dissent.63 In Reed H, the court
expounded further upon the Acker-Reed rule and renounced the more
extreme positions taken in Reed I. In regard to its "at the surface" test,
the court explained that the word "surface" was to have depth. A disputed
substance was "at the surface" if it was at "a depth shallow enough that
it must have been contemplated that its removal would be by a surface
destructive method." ' Evidence of one outcrop on the tract in question
and others in the county sufficiently demonstrated that the lignite was "at
the surface"; therefore, the lignite was not an "other mineral" reserved
to the mineral owner.65
Although the facts of the case did not require it to do so, the court
went on to specifically reject the argument that the controverted deposit
must outcrop, or be at the surface of, the particular tract in question.'
A requirement that the near surface location of the substance be shown
for each tract was perceived as placing an undue burden on the owners
of small surface tracts. Instead, the surface owner needed only to show
that the controverted substance was at the surface in the "reasonably
immediate vicinity," and a showing that the substance was merely "near
the surface" in the reasonably immediate vicinity would also be adequate.67 The court added that a deposit within 200 feet of the surface was
"near the surface" as a matter of law.68
The opinion explained that, once the "at the surface" test was satisfied,
evidence of available mining techniques was immaterial.69 Nevertheless,
the court seized the opportunity to expressly overrule that portion of Reed
I which required a prevailing surface owner to show that a substance
could only be removed by surface destructive methods. 7" Recognizing
the inequities and debates which could stem from efforts to determine
63. On remand, the trial court again granted the surface owner's motion for summary judgement
after finding that coal and lignite were at the surface of the land. Id. at 744. The Court of Civil
Appeals again reversed. Wylie v. Reed, 579 S.W.2d 329, 333 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979), affd
on other grounds, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980). The supreme court affirmed the judgement of the
Court of Civil Appeals, but it disagreed with the holding and opinion of that court as to the ownership
of the lignite. 597 S.W.2d at 744.
64. Id. at 746.
65. Id. at 745-46.
66. Id. at 748.
67. Id.
68. Id. The court did not explain whether "surface" as used in this context was a legal term of
art with depth or whether it was to be defined in some other manner, such as where the earth meets
its atmosphere.
69. Id. at 746.
70. See id. at 747. This portion of the opinion embodies many of the points urged in the concurring
and dissenting opinions of Reed I. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text. Chief Justice
Greenhill, the author of the concurring opinion in that case, authored the majority opinion in Reed
H.
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the state of the art of a substance's removal upon some date in the past,
the court also overruled that part of Reed I which required an inquiry
into whether the surface would have been destroyed as of the date of the
instrument." Both concessions represented a return to Acker and the
notion that the close physical relationship of a substance to the surface
was the controlling factor.72 Chief Justice Greenhill, the author of the
majority opinion, announced the new rule: "The rule for near surface
lignite, iron or coal, therefore, is that if the deposit lies near the surface,
the substance will not be granted or retained as a mineral if it is shown
that any reasonable method of production would destroy or deplete the
surface. "73
Justice Spears wrote a concurring opinion in which he agreed with the
analysis and results reached by the majority.74 While praising the announced rule for reducing uncertainty as to the ownership of coal and
lignite, he criticized the rule for failing to provide "identifiable and
workable criteria to either mineral or surface owners." '75 The opinion
advocated the abandonment of any rule which would require tract-bytract determination of mineral ownership; it urged the adoption of a rule
which would allow any person reading a mineral lease to know from the
instrument itself what had been .granted or reserved, without resort to
factual investigation.76 Justice Spears concluded that an alternative could
71. 597 S.W.2d at 747. Although the court eliminated or reduced many evidentiary difficulties
by backing away from its "at the time of conveyance" requirement, it introduced a new element
by doing so. Under the new rule, as new technologies become developed and different mining
techniques shift from impracticality to reasonableness to obsolescence, the title to unspecified minerals
could also shift. One commentator has described this possibility as the "passage of title by technology." See Patton, Recent Changes in the Correlative Rights of Surface and Mineral Owners, 18
ROCKY MTN. Mn'. L. INST. 19, 25-26 (1973).
72. 597 S.W.2d at 747.
73. Id. The court added that "The strip-mining method of removal used in Reed is a reasonable
method as a matter of law for the purposes of this holding." Id. at 748. It should be noted that in
both announcements of the rule in Reed 1I, the substances enumerated were limited to lignite, coal
or iron. Id. at 747, 748.
74. Id. at 750 (Spears, J., concurring).
75. Id.
76. Justice Spears perceived at least four possible factual issues implicit in the Acker-Reed rule:
(1) whether deposits were in the "reasonable immediate vicinity"; (2) whether there were deposits
"at or near" the surface; (3) whether the deposits conformed generally to the contour of the earth's
surface; and (4) what was a "reasonable" method of recovery.
The opinion's suggestions followed two themes. Under the first theory, the questions on mineral
ownership and reasonable use of the surface would be divided into two separate issues. "Minerals"
would be construed as those substances normally regarded as minerals regardless of the method of
extraction, but the mineral estate owner would be limited to only the reasonable use of the surface
for extraction of his or her minerals. In the absence of an affirmative expression to the contrary, the
mineral estate owner would not be allowed to employ any method which would destroy, consume,
or deplete the surface. A variant of this theme would be to limit the easement to well bores and
mine shafts and so much of the surface as would be reasonably necessary for operations, thereby
dividing the ownership of mineral substances by their method of extraction. Deposits recoverable
by surface mining techniques would belong to the surface owner, those recoverable through wells
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be developed which would give greater clarity and definition to the ownership of resources without significantly impairing the interests of those
who had relied on Acker and Reed.77
The Surface DestructionTest in Review
The Texas Supreme Court's endeavor to accommodate what it perceived to be the general intent of the parties led to a rule fraught with
factual uncertainty. Although the Reed II test resulted in far less of a
burden than Reed I, a determination of the ownership of an unspecified
mineral might still require extensive factual inquiry. The decision required
investigation into the location of the deposits on or near a disputed tract
and the availability of various mining methods. Except in those instances
where the substance outcropped on the surface of the land, the determination of the rights to a substance might not be conclusive until the
parameters of the entire deposit were determined. Such factors only exacerbated the uncertainty already associated with searching for minerals.
A mineral owner could invest in the exploration of a tract and delineate
the boundaries of the deposit only to find that the substance was near the
surface on a nearby tract.78 Others might find the title to a substance
shifting out of their hands as innovation introduced and made reasonable
mining techniques which were previously unavailable. Furthermore, a
multitude of commercial and technological variables could be introduced
to determine whether a surface destructive technique was a reasonable
alternative, regardless of whether either of the two parties contemplated
or would contemplate the use of that particular technique. These factual
complexities inevitably frustrated the objectives of many who needed to
rely on the Acker-Reed test. As noted by Justice Spears, mineral and
surface owners sought a definite and certain rule of ownership that would
be fair, lend stability to land titles, and allow the development
of vital
79
energy resources to proceed unimpeded by title uncertainty.
The most troubling aspect of the Acker-Reed rule was the parties'
inability to determine the ownership of a mineral from the face of an
instrument of conveyance.80 The court had expressly rejected inquiries
or mine shafts to the mineral estate owner. Those recoverable by either method would belong to the
dominant mineral estate, subject to the limitations prohibiting surface destruction. Under the second
type of alternative, in the absence of an affirmative expression to the contrary, coal and lignite would
belong to the surface estate as a matter of law, regardless of the depth of the reserves or the means
of extraction. "Other minerals" would simply not include lignite and coal as a matter of law. Id.
at 750-51.
77. Id. at 751-52.
78. Naturally, these circumstances would compel many of those interested in exploration to seek
quitclaim agreements from both the surface and the mineral estate owners, but such private initiative
would not obviate the need for a more definitive legal framework.
79. 597 S.W.2d at 750.
80. See Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 101. See generally Note, supranote 35; Comment, Lignite: Surface
or Mineral-The Surface Destruction Test and More, 29 BAYLOR L.REv. 879 (1977).
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into the parties' intent. 8' Instead, it sought to determine the parties "general intent." 2 The court purported to recognize that, in most instances,
the parties did not intend to convey any specific minerals through general
terminology such as "other minerals." 83 Nevertheless, the court's decisions indicated that the underlying objective of the approach was an
inquiry into the reasonable intentions of the parties to the transaction.84
The inquiries in Heinatz differed only in emphasis from those employed
in Acker, but the latter decision represented a distinct move away from
the former's determination of the ordinary and natural meaning of the
word "mineral." In Heinatz, the court strongly implied that, absent unusual circumstances or an affirmative expression to the contrary, sand,
gravel, and limestone were not conveyed by the term "minerals." 85 In
Acker, however, the court made the test for title determination more site
specific.86 Reed I and Reed H intensified this site specificity and expanded
the court's rule to encompass a multitude of factual issues.87 Despite
numerous remarks that stated the intentions of the parties were immaterial,
the court's test increasingly grew to resemble a search for the reasonable
intentions of the parties to each dispute. Instead of inquiring into the
intent of a reasonable person who would use the term "other minerals"
in a mineral conveyance, the inquiry became one of the intent of a
reasonable person who would use the term "other minerals" in the specific
81. Reed!, 554 S.W.2d at 172.
82. Reed 11, 597 S.W.2d at 747; Reed!, 554 S.W.2d at 171-72; Acker, 464 S.W.2d at 352.
83. See, e.g., Reed!, 554 S.W.2d at 171 (stating the court's belief that, in most cases of unnamed
minerals which subsequently become valuable, the subsequent controversy decides who will be
enriched by a substance that was not part of the parties' intentions at the time of the bargain); Acker,
464 S.W.2d at 352 (quoting with approval the article by Professor Kuntz in which he asserted that
the parties probably had no intention to include or exclude a specific substance with the general
term "minerals").
84. Cf., e.g., Reed!!, 597 S.W.2d at 747 (altering the Reedl requirement that means of extraction
be considered as of the date of the instrument by referring to the general intent of the parties to not
destroy the surface at any time); Reed , 554 S.W.2d at 172 (stating that the court could not expect
the parties to have intended the destruction of the surface by the mineral owner); Acker, 464 S.W.2d
at 352 (interpreting "minerals" as excluding substances that must be removed by methods that will
deplete the surface by reference to the intent of the parties not to impair utility of the surface for
otherpurposes); Heinatz, 217 S.W.2d at 997 (interpreting "minerals" in ordinary rather than scientific
sense in order to give effect to the intention of the testatrix who, absent any clear indication to the
contrary, was presumed to have been familiar with the ordinary meaning of the word). Although
the court never described its test as an inquiry into the parties "reasonable intent," the test may be
appropriately characterized as such an inquiry. See infra text accompanying notes 88-90. See also
Note, supra note 35, at 111 (describing intent to be the apparent rationale of the court, but arguing
that such an intent could not be inferred). But see Note, Moser v. United States Steel Corp.: Owners
of "Other Minerals"Hit PayDirt as Texas BuriesAcker-Reed Surface DestructionTest, 5 J. ENERGY
L. & POL'Y 147, 156 (1983) (stating in regard to theAcker-Reed test: "Mineral ownership had become
not a question of the parties' intent or even a question of law, but a question of fact oftentimes not
judicially ascertainable because of the uncertainty of geologic data.").
85. See supranote 27 and accompanying text.
86. Compare supranotes 16-27 and accompanying text with supranotes 29-41 and accompanying
text.
87. See supra notes 42-77 and accompanying text.
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mineral conveyance at issue. The inquiry paradoxically suggested that
the reasonable party to a conveyance would make numerous factual inquiries about a particular substance and then fail to specifically enumerate
that substance in the instrument of conveyance.
Rather than viewing the rule as a test which avoids inquiry into the
parties' intent, one may view it as a rule designed merely to limit the
extrinsic evidence to be evaluated in the determination of reasonable
intent.88 The surface destruction test limits the evidence used to determine
the ownership of an "other mineral"-geological and technical information is given preeminent consideration and other extrinsic evidence is
excluded 59-- but if the rule's primary function was to restrain the introduction of evidence, the rule's primary problem was that it did not restrain
enough."
MOSER v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORP.:
DEPARTURE FROM THE SURFACE DESTRUCTION TEST FOR
SUBSTANCES DETERMINED TO BE "OTHER MINERALS" BY LAW
In Moser v. United States Steel Corp.,91 the Texas Supreme Court has
again reexamined its rule for the allocation of "other minerals." The new
rule represents an effort to add definition and clarity to the term "other
minerals" and reduce the factual inquiries incident to the determination
of their ownership.
Moser: Determination of Other Minerals by Law
At issue in Moser was whether uranium was included in a 1949 reservation of "oil, gas and other minerals." 92 The nearest ore horizon was
approximately 193 feet below the surface, with another more substantial
88. Cf. Heinatz, 217 S.W.2d at 995 (before exploring the relationship of the substance to the
surface and other factors, stating that "the intention of the testatrix as to what is devised is to be
ascertained without aid from evidence as to the attending circumstances"); Reed 1, 554 S.W.2d at
182 (Daniel, J., dissenting) (stating that decisions prior to Reed I were not concerned with subjective
intent, knowledge, or attendant circumstances in their effort to determine the parties' intent, but that
Reed I's requirements which "must be proved" would base the intention of the parties not on the
language of the document but on matters of fact and opinion evidence).
89. For example, extrinsic evidence might include information as to the context of the conveyance,
the state of mineral knowledge common to the area at the date of the conveyance, or discussions
between the parties.
90. See Reed H, 597 S.W.2d at 750, 752 (Spears, J., concurring) (praising the court for backing
away from the more factually intensive requirements of Reed Ibut advocating a further withdrawal
from the mire of tract-by-tract determination of mineral ownership by extrinsic evidence); infra notes
104-05 and accompanying text.
91. 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984). The Texas Supreme Court issued its first opinion on the case
on June 8, 1983. 26 TEx. Sup. Cr. J. 427 (June 8, 1983), withdrawn and replaced by 676 S.W.2d
99 (1984). For discussion of the substantive differences between the two opinions, see infra notes
114-16, 120, 127 and accompanying texts.
92. 676 S.W.2d at 100. Although the instrument at issue used the terms "all of the oil, gas and
minerals of every kind and character," the opinion identified the question as one of interpreting the
meaning of "oil, gas and other minerals" and did not restate the latter part of the actual phrase. Id.
at 100.
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horizon occurring approximately 325 feet below the surface. 93 Although
there was conflicting evidence as to whether strip mining techniques or
underground mining techniques would have been employed to extract the
deposits in 1949, subsequent developments had produced solution mining
techniques which would not consume or deplete the surface estate.94 The
uranium ore on the tract in question was part of a major formation which
had been mined exclusively by these in-situ leaching or solution mining
techniques,9' and it was undisputed that the uranium would be mined
through these methods in 1979, the year of trial. 96 A jury found that
extraction would not have necessarily resulted in substantial surface destruction at the time the deed was executed. Accordingly, the trial court
held the uranium to be part of the mineral estate on the basis of the rule
set forth in Reed 1. 9' The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, based upon
the rule announced in Reed H.98 The appellate court found that, as a
matter of law, the only reasonable method of mining uranium from the
tract at the time of trial was by in-situ leaching or solution mining, a
process which it found did not result in substantial destruction of the
surface.99
The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the court below but, in
doing so, it expressly abandoned the Acker-Reed approach. " The court
proclaimed:
We now hold a severance of minerals in an oil, gas and other minerals
clause includes all substances within the ordinary and natural meaning of that word, whether their presence or value is known at the
time of extraction. (Citations omitted.) We also hold uranium is a
mineral within the ordinary and natural meaning of the word. .... "'
93. Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 601 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980)
aff'd on othergrounds, 676 S.W.2d 99 (1984). The court did not indicate whether the word "surface"
was used as a legal term of art and was itself meant to have depth.
94. See id. The court explained:
Solution mining is a process by which wells are drilled into ore horizons containing
uranium and solvents are injected through these wells to capture the uranium from the
land in solution form ....
The evidence conclusively established that the surface is
not depleted or destroyed by the solution mining process.
Id. at 734. But at least one Texas court has found that an in-situ or solution mining method could
impair the surface. See Kenny v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 351 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1961, writ ref d) (mineral owner not liable for causing two inch to three feet subsidence of surface
in connection with the extraction of sulphur).
95. 601 S.W.2d at 733-34.
96. See id. at 732, 733.
97. 676 S.W.2d at 100.
98. 601 S.W.2d at 732-34.
99. Id. at 734.
100. 676 S.W.2d at 101.
101. Id. at 102. In the first version of Moser, this section of the opinion read: "all substances
within the ordinary and natural meaning of that word, whether their presence or value is known at
the time of extraction." 26 TEX. S. CT. J. at 429 (emphasis added). Presumably the earlier use of
"extraction" was unintentional. Unlike the term "severance," it has little explanatory worth, because
the presence and value of most minerals, especially those subject to dispute, is known at extraction.
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The opinion recounted the numerous construction aids that Texas courts
had considered and rejected, 2 and it acknowledged that the previous
rules had aimed at two objectives, effectuating the parties' intent to convey
valuable minerals to the mineral estate owner while at the same time
protecting the surface owner from any destruction of the surface that
might result from extraction. 0 3 The court allowed that the Acker-Reed
rule generated title uncertainty. The multitude of factual issues it introduced made it impossible to ascertain the ownership of a substance from
the face of the instrument of conveyance."'4 By condemning this uncertainty, the court strongly implied that definition and clarity were the
primary objectives underlying the new rule. 5
Having announced that the mineral estate owner was entitled to uranium
by law, the court turned to the issue of defining a reasonable use of the
surface estate by the uranium owner.0 6 While reaffirming the general rule
that the mineral owner, as owner of the dominant estate, has the right to
make any use of the surface reasonably and necessarily incident to the
removal of minerals, the court drew a distinction between the use of the
surface for minerals specifically conveyed and its use for those which are
not. The court explained that restricting the mineral owner's liability to
negligently inflicted damage or to excessive use of the surface might be
justified where a mineral was specifically conveyed,0 7 but that the rationale was not compelling when a grantor conveyed by general language
a mineral for which removal could destroy the surface. Accordingly, the
court held that the general limitation of the mineral owner's liability to
negligently inflicted damages does not control in a conveyance of un102. Id. at 101-02. See, e.g., Southland Royalty Co. v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 378
S.W.2d 50 (Tex. 1964) (refusing to employ the rule of ejusdem generis to limit the terms "oil, gas
and other minerals" to hydrocarbons); Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 517, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997
(1949) (rejecting the scientific or technical definition of the word "minerals" because it would
obfuscate any distinction between the surface and mineral estates); Cain v. Newmann, 316 S.W.2d
915, 922 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1958, no writ) (stating that the knowledge of the parties
of the value, or even the existence of a substance at the time of its conveyance, is irrelevant to its
inclusion or exclusion from a grant of minerals).
103. 676 S.W.2d at 101.
104. Id.
105. See infra notes 135, 137-38 and accompanying texts.
106. 676 S.W.2d at 102-03. The separation of the mineral title and surface protection questions
was suggested by Justice Spears in his concurring Reed 11 opinion. See supra note 76.
107. Id. at 103. The court perceived the mineral owner's easement as an "imperative rule of
mineral law," without which the mineral owner's estate would be worthless. Id. It reasoned that the
limitation upon the mineral owner's liability was justified because:
It is reasonable to assume a grantor who expressly conveys a mineral which may
or must be removed by destroying a portion of the surface estate anticipates his
surface estate will be diminished when the mineral is removed. It is also probable
the grantor has calculated the value of the diminution of his surface in the compensation received for the conveyance.
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specified minerals." 8 Where the mineral owner has taken title to an unnamed substance, he or she must compensate the surface owner for surface
destruction."9 The mineral owner under the grant or reservation remains
restricted in his use of the surface estate by the "due record" or "accommodation doctrine"; however, the holding does not affect the right
of a mineral owner to enter and use so much of the surface as is reasonably
necessary to remove the minerals."'
The holding of Moser is not to be applied retroactively. Due to the
possibility of public reliance on the holdings of Acker and Reed H, a
provision in the opinion explains that the rules of Moser are to be applied
"only prospectively" from the date of the original opinion, June 8, 1983."'
The Scope of the New Rule
The rule set forth in Moser unequivocally allocates the ownership of
uranium in a conveyance severing the ownership of oil, gas and other
minerals; however, the language and history of the opinion obscure its
scope as to the substances to which it applies and the period for which
it is to be used.
The substances to which Moser applies
Despite the general language in the opinion which implies that the new
rule applies to "all substances within the ordinary and natural meaning"
of the word minerals,"2 other phrases may limit the scope of the rule to
uranium. The most notable illustration is the court's denouncement of its
previous test: "We now abandon, in the case of uranium, the Acker and
Reed approach to determining ownership of 'other minerals' and hold that
title to 3uranium is held by the owner of the mineral estate as a matter of
law. "'
This language could be construed as merely confining the language of
the holding to the facts of the case, but the history of the opinion implies
108. Id.
109. Id. The holding does not affect the statutory duty of the mineral owner or lessee to reclaim
the surface after surface mining. Id. at 103 n.4. See Texas Uranium Surface Mining and Reclamation
Act, Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. §§ 131.001-.270 (Vernon 1978 & Supp. 1984). See also Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. V 1981) (establishing need
for surface mining and reclamation standards). Among other things, the Texas Code provides the
surface owner with an opportunity to have the land classified as unsuitable for surface mining if he
believes the land cannot be reclaimed according to the Code's strict standards. Tex. Nat. Res. Code
Ann. §§ 131.038, -.039, -. 047. The Code also demands all reclamation efforts proceed as contemporaneously as practicable with the surface mining operations. Id. at § 131. 102(b)(14).
110. 676 S.W.2d at 103. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text; infra notes 151-54 and
accompanying text.
111. 676 S.W.2d at 103.
112. See supra text accompanying note 101.
113. 676 S.W.2d at 101 (emphasis added).
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that it may have greater significance. In the supreme court's first Moser
opinion, the abandonment was not expressly limited to uranium." 4 The
phrase "in the case of uranium" was nonexistent and "uranium" read "a
substance which we have determined to be a mineral."" 5 That this was
one of only three substantive alterations made to the opinion upon its
withdrawal and replacement" 6 may imply that the court intends to limit
the applicability of the Moser rule to uranium.
Other language in the opinion addresses the ownership of substances
previously construed by the courts as either "minerals" or part of the
surface estate. After holding that a severance of minerals in an oil, gas
and other minerals clause included "all substances within the ordinary
and natural meaning of that word," and that uranium was such a substance, the court expressly noted that it would continue to adhere to prior
decisions which held certain substances "to belong to the surface estate
as a matter of law."" 7 The first opinion of the court cited four examples
of such decisions," 8 each of which used the common or ordinary and
natural meaning of the word "minerals" to determine the ownership of
limestone, stone, caliche, surface shale, sand, gravel, or water. " 9 The
second version of the opinion contains a fifth example: Reed H.2 By
citing Reed H with approval, the court has implied that the surface destruction test still has application. The inference is further corroborated
114. See 26 TEx. Sup. CT. J. at 428.
115. Compare 26 TEX. Sup. CT. J. at 428 with 676 S.W.2d at 101. In addition to the two changes
described above, the word "minerals" in the first version was changed to "other minerals" in the
second.
116. Compare 26 TEX. Sup. Or. J. 427 with 676 S.W.2d 99. The remaining two substantive
changes are discussed below. See infra notes 120, 127 and accompanying texts. The only other
alteration of the first opinion was the correction of a clerical error in the description of the case
facts.
117. 676 S.W.2d at 102.
118. 26 TEx. Sup. Cr. J. at 429. The court cited the following examples: Heinatz v. Allen, 217
S.W.2d 994 (building stone and limestone); Atwood v. Rodman, 355 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App.El Paso 1962 writ ref'd n.r.e.) (limestone, caliche, and surface shale); Fleming Foundation v. Texaco,
337 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, writ ref d n.r.e.) (water); Psencik v. Wessels,
205 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, writ ref d) (sand and gravel).
119. Cf. Heinatz, supra notes 14-25 and accompanying text; Atwood, 355 S.W.2d 206 (although
discussing surface damage that would result from the mining of limestone, holding that "other
minerals" did not include limestone, caliche, clay and surface shale because those substances were
not within the ordinary meaning of the word); Fleming Foundation, 337 S.W.2d 846 (determining
that the term "other minerals" does not include subsurface water under its ordinary meaning); Psencik,
205 S.W.2d 658 (holding that, absent an expressed intent to the contrary, sand and gravel were not
minerals because the word minerals should only include those substances commonly regarded as
minerals).
120. 676 S.W.2d at 102. The other four examples were retained. Compareid. with 26 TaX. Sup.
CT. J. at 429. Reed H was also added to another string-cite earlier in the opinion where the court
listed examples of previous decisions made in its effort to catalog substances as impliedly reserved
to the mineral or surface estates. Compare 676 S.W.2d at 101 with 26 TEx. Sup. CT. J. at 428. The
addition of Reed H to these two string citations is the second of the three substantive distinctions
mentioned supra note 116.
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by the withdrawal of the opinion which did not cite Reed H or restrict
the holding to uranium and the replacement of that opinion with language
which implies that the surface destruction test may still have life.
A parenthetical explanation adds that the substances held to belong to
the surface estate as a matter of law in Reed H were "near surface lignite,
iron and coal." 2 ' Although the other examples given by the court were
not qualified by their substances' proximities to the surface,' 22 the court
clearly acknowledged that Reed H was so qualified. By its own language,
ReedHI's application was limited to "near surface lignite, iron or coal."' 23
Accordingly, the second Moser opinion could even be interpreted as
leaving Reed II untouched. But under an alternative reading, Reed H
would only apply to "near surface" deposits so that, even after a showing
that such deposits existed, the mineral estate owner would be entitled to
any deeper deposits if such deposits were within the ordinary and natural
meaning of the word "mineral." If lignite, iron and coal deposits were
construed under Reed H to be not near the surface, the mineral estate
owner would probably still be liable to the surface owner for damages
to the surface estate. Language of the damage section of the opinion
strongly implies that it applies to all unnamed substances which vest in
' Nevertheless, the Moser opinion leaves unanswered
the mineral estate. 24
several significant questions regarding the substances to which its other
provisions are applicable.
Moser introduces substantial certainty as to the ownership of uranium
and certain other substances. Nevertheless, the decision aggravates the
title uncertainty surrounding lignite, coal, and iron. It was these substances which were the subjects of the Reed II decision and, ironically,
'
whose uncertainty of title was the ostensible rationale for the new rule. 26
Despite these difficulties, however, once the court has declared the ownership of these other substances by law, the Moser rule will provide the
predictability for which it was designed.
ProspectiveApplication of the Moser Decision
The court's attempt to protect the interests of those who relied on the
holdings of Acker and Reed leaves some troubling questions. In the court's
121. 676 S.W.2d at 101-02 (emphasis added). The words "near surface" were used to qualify
the significance of Reed II in both of the citations which were added to the second version of the
opinion. Id.
122. See supra note 119.
123. See 597 S.W.2d at 747. One may even speculate that the language of Reed II which limited
its application to lignite, iron or coal, see id., and the absence of such language in Acker, see supra
notes 34, 36-38 and accompanying texts, led to the inclusion of Reed 11 and the exclusion of Acker
from the list of cases cited with approval in Moser.
124. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
125. See supra text accompanying note 119.
126. See 676 S.W.2d at 101.
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second opinion, it explained that the rules announced in Moser "are to
be applied only prospectively" from the date of the original opinion, June
8, 1983. 7 What is the event which determines the applicable rule? One
12
may reasonably assume the critical event is the date of the conveyance, 1
for an assumption that the new rule is to be applied prospectively from
the date of the opinion would deprive the provision of any worth. But
the first assumption brings the value of the entire decision into question.
Assuming that the applicable law is to be determined by the date of
the disputed conveyance, then the rules of Moser would apply to unnamed
minerals severed from surface estates after June 8, 1983. But if this is
all that the new rule covers, then it provides little relief to the many
parties holding mineral or surface interests severed before that date. 2 9
Under this interpretation, the prospective application provision would
severely cripple the new rule's ability to meet its implied objective. The
decision would do nothing to clarify the title to minerals severed from
the surface prior to June 8, 1983. On the other hand, quite similar difficulties arise if one interprets the provision as applying to interests which
have already been severed. Because mineral interests may be severed
from the surface on a piecemeal basis, 31 one would need to establish
what had and had not been severed from the surface on June 8 before
one could prospectively apply the new rule. One would still face the task
of determining what had and had not been severed under the old rules.
Such determination would by definition produce the same uncertainty and
costs which were associated with the Acker-Reed approach. Again, the
outcome would provide little comfort to the many parties already holding
severed mineral or surface interests before June 8, 1983.
The provision introduces further problems to those who wish to transfer
127. Id. at 103. The original opinion held that all contracts, leases and deeds dealing with minerals
that were executed between the Acker and original Moser opinions would be controlled by the law
in effect at the time the instrument was executed. 26 TEx. Sup. CT. J. at 430. Under this earlier
provision, three different rules were required for the determination of the title to minerals in different
instruments previously controlled solely by Reed H. For a brief discussion of the problems posed
by this earlier holding, see Note, supra note 48, at 716-19.
128. Although the analogous provision of the original opinion held that the date that a disputed
instrument was executed would determine the law under which it would be interpreted, see 26 TEx.
Sup. CT. J. at 430, this language was dropped from the second opinion, see 676 S.W.2d at 103.
Nevertheless, one may reasonably assume that the reference to the instrument was not the object of
the revision, see supra note 127, and that the date of execution of the instrument remains the
determinative factor. Conveyance is the most obvious point for the parties to develop a reliance
interest, and any subsequent enhancements or improvements to either estate would have presumably
been made in reliance on the conveyance.
129. The emptiness of the rule becomes even more evident if one considers that, for those
agreements drafted with the aid of a competent attorney, the state of the law would dictate that
known minerals be specifically enumerated in the instruments.
130. Note that the ability to sever various substances on a piecemeal basis underlies the line of
cases considered in this note. If piecemeal severance was not allowed, then the specific enumeration
of substances in a conveyance would serve no purpose.
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their interests. Ambiguities will inevitably arise when a party who owns
a substance under the grandfather clause tries to convey it. For example,
could a surface owner who owned a substance not yet of commercial
interest under Reed H freely convey his or her interest? Alternatively,
what claims in regard to the substance would a third party have if he or
she purchased the underlying mineral estate under the belief that the term
"other minerals" includes the substance? Respecting the allocations between mineral and surface estates at June 8, 1983, will allow the uncertainties of the Acker-Reed definition of other minerals to haunt titles for
years to come. On the other hand, refusing to respect those initial allocations may create an undesirable restraint on transferability.
Prospective application of a rule is most appropriate where the aim of
the rule is to affect behavior, and the Moser decision should notify those
involved with mineral title conveyancing of the need to specifically enumerate known minerals in the instrument of conveyance. The mandate
is especially clear for those substances of which the parties are aware but
for which the court has yet to determine ownership. Even so, the decision
may not significantly affect behavior. The previous decisions of the court
should have already put those involved in mineral conveyancing on notice
of the need to specifically enumerate known substances. 3' Similarly, those
drafting such instruments should have already been aware of the need to
specifically delineate horizontal severances by depth or horizon, if so
desired, or to limit or express the breadth of various easements expected.
Those prior existing demands upon those who assisted in the drafting of
instruments should have tempered the need for prospective application
of the Moser decision.' 32 Although behavior modification is the general
rationale behind the prospective application of a rule, it is unlikely that
the Moser rule will significantly alter the behavior of competent attorneys
or other persons engaged in mineral conveyancing.
The foregoing suggests that behavior modification should not have
been a prominent factor in the development of a means for the determination of "other minerals." Although the precise impact of the pros131. Cf. Reed 1, 554 S.W.2d at 172 (stating that the mineral estate owner's intentions would
have been clearly expressed had the instrument specifically reserved coal and lignite or expressly
reserved all minerals lying upon the surface or at any depth and including those minerals which may
be produced by open pit or strip mining).
132. As Justice Spears noted in his dissent to Reed 11:
The only likely change in the conduct of surface owners who were aware of (Acker
and Reed) would have been to specifically name iron, coal, and lignite in their grant
or reservation and thus remove any doubt about their intent. Similarly, mineral
lessees and grantees who wished to develop iron ore or coal and lignite after those
decisions would have had to purchase rights to those substances from both the
surface owner and the mineral owner in order to be assured that they had obtained
the right to extract those substances.
597 S.W.2d at 751-52.
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pective application provision is unclear, it is clear that the prospective
application provision falls far short of quieting the title to minerals severed
from or reserved to the surface estate prior to January 8, 1983. Accordingly, this provision and its ambiguity could hamper the ability of the
Moser rules to effectuate their purpose.
MOSER EXAMINED
The Texas Supreme Court knew that its Moser decision would signal
a significant departure from its recent efforts to determine the ownership
of "other minerals." '33While acknowledging that any significant changes
to a property rule could not be taken lightly, the court recognized a
compelling need for a more definitive rule.' 34 It specifically criticized the
unpredictability of the Acker-Reed approach.' 35 The court sought a rule
that would reduce the factual issues of title determination to those which
could be gleaned from the face of an instrument of conveyance.' 3 6 Once
the aforementioned scope ambiguities are settled, the rule should provide
the sought-after means of determining the title of certain "other minerals"
from the face of instruments. This objective will be satisfied.
The opinion does not explain whether other policies were intended to
be met by the new rule. ' Except for criticism of prior rules and proposals,
the opinion is remarkably devoid of any supporting rationales or explanations. But policy is generally called upon in the face of uncertainty or
where a court must allocate between parties that for which they have not
bargained. 3 ' Earlier elaborations by the court recognized that, in all
probability, these "other mineral" determinations merely allocated between surface and mineral estates those substances the allocation of which
the parties had not contemplated at the date of conveyance. 39 The es133. Cf., e.g., Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 102-03 (distinguishing the new holding from prior decisions);
id. at 103 (providing for prospective application because of the perceived significance of the departure
from the surface destruction test).
134. Cf. 676 S.W.2d at 103 (providing for prospective application of the new rule because of
public reliance upon prior formulations). See also ReedIl, 597 S.W.2d at 751 (Spears, J., dissenting)
("It is axiomatic that rules of property are not to be tampered with lightly or easily changed.").
135. 676 S.W.2d at 101.
136. The sentence summarizes the ostensible objectives offered by the court. Cf. id. (criticizing
the Acker-Reed rule's failure to satisfy this objective).
137. See 676 S.W.2d 99. The reference to the "new rule" is to that regarding the ownership of
unnamed minerals. That portion of the holding which pertains to damages is well supported. See
id. at 102-03. The court's path of logic may be summarized as follows: (1) Acker-Reed provided
the previous rule; (2) that rule produced title uncertainty; (3) the court has rejected other proposed
rules, for in the past it has tried to effectuate the parties' intent; therefore, (4) the court now holds
that uranium is included within the word "mineral" by law. See id. at 100-02.
138. See.Note, supra note 35, at 110-24.
139. See, e.g., Reed 1, 554 S.W.2d at 171 (stating the court's belief that, in most cases of
unnamed minerals which subsequently become valuable, the subsequent controversy decides who
will be enriched by a substance for which the parties had no intention at the time of their bargain);
Acker, 464 S.W.2d at 352 (quoting with approval an article by Professor Kuntz in which he asserted
that the parties probably had no specific intent to include or exclude a specific substance with the
general term "minerals").
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tablishment of a clear rule of title determination may have been the court's
preeminent consideration," but under such circumstances other policies
probably were or should have been considered.
The parties may not have contemplated the allocation of a particular
unnamed substance, but the typical conveyance does arise in the context
of a bargain, gift, or devise. Accordingly, the intent of the reasonable
person in such a context would be one relevant policy consideration.
While one portion of the opinion implicitly rejects any inquiry into the
parties' intent, 141 the damage provision explicitly attempts to accommodate what the parties may have reasonably anticipated at the time of
conveyance. 42 Similarly, the reference to the parties' reliance in the prospective application provision represents an attempt to respect the parties'
reasonable expectations. Since both the trial and the appellate courts found
that reasonable parties to the conveyance would have intended for the
uranium to be part of the mineral estate and the supreme court affirmed
those decisions, 143 the determination under a reasonable intent analysis
coincides with the determination under Moser. The Moser opinion also
reaffirms Heinatz,'44 a decision which was never explicitly overruled
despite the court's journey away from it during the Reed years. Heinatz
was expressly aimed at effectuating the reasonable expectations of the
party who had executed the contested conveyance. "5 The foregoing suggest that the reasonable expectations of the parties to a conveyance of
oil, gas and other minerals was one of the court's considerations in Moser.
How reasonable are the expectations endorsed by Moser? Allocation
of uranium to the mineral estate may in itself be quite reasonable. Both
of the lower courts found that the solution mining available to the owner
of the uranium under the Moser tract would not have impaired the surface
substantially. 146 Where solution or in-situ methods may be used, the surface owner will be able to enjoy a substantial portion of the surface's
total utility and be compensated for that which is lost. 47 In this situation,
the rule accommodates the general enjoyment of the surface in the manner
advocated by Professor Kuntz."'4 Problems might arise, however, where
other, more desolution or in-situ methods are not available or where
49
structive, methods are available in the alternative. 1
140. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
141. Cf. 676 S.W.2d at 101 (noting that the court had previously attempted to create a rule which
would effectuate the parties' intent and that such a rule was factually cumbersome, implying that
the new rule would not have such burdensome inquiries into intent).
142. See id. at 103.
143. Id. at 100-01.
144. Id. at 102.
145. See supra notes 84, 88 and accompanying texts.
146. 601 S.W.2d at 732.
147. For a description of the in-situ processes, see supra note 94 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 39-40.
149. In-site or solution mining methods may also impair the surface in unexpected ways. See
supra note 94.
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The court suggests a means of alleviating any unnecessary burden upon
the surface owner. 5 Where a choice exists between in-situ or other
reasonable mining methods, the doctrines of due regard and available
alternative means may be extended to compel the mineral owner to use
the least destructive alternative. 5' Where only surface destructive means
of extraction are available, the surface owner might still endeavor to show
' Naturally, whether
that less destructive means could be made available. 52
such alternatives would be required would turn on questions of reasonableness.' 5 3 The doctrines of due regard and reasonable alternative means
will only be of aid where more preferable means are reasonably available.' Where the in-situ or solution approach is used, the consequences
to the surface may be quite similar to those resulting from the extraction
of oil or gas with the aid of injection wells."' Assuming no piecemeal
severance of minerals was intended, the rule in this instance would accommodate the objectives of both of the interested estates. But where
the mineral owner plans to extract uranium ore by strip or pit mining
techniques, the reasonableness of the Moser rule arguably hinges on the
adequacy of the surface owner's compensation.
The surface damage provision of the Moser decision entitles the surface
owner to compensation for his or her loss of the surface's enjoyment.' 56
The decision explicitly recognizes that the loss was not one for which
the surface owner bargained,' 5 7 implying that considerations of fairness
150. 676 S.W.2d at 103.
151. For a description of these two doctrines, see supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
Moserrepresented the first of this line of cases in which either of these two doctrines were mentioned.
676 S.W.2d at 103. The two Reed cases had implied that the doctrines were not to be considered
in this context. See supra note 55.
152. For example, where plants for in-situ extraction have not been built, uranium deposits would
presumably be mined by the conventional strip mining techniques which were used before the former
process was developed. See generally Crawford, DevelopersEye Texas Potentialfor In-situ Uranium
Leaching, ENGINEERING AND MnINNG J. 81 (July 1975). Could the surface owner who wished to
preserve his or her property prevail upon showing that the new plant should be built? Not under the
current version of the doctrine, which limits the available alternative means to those available on
the premises itself. See supra note 11. Nevertheless, it would not be illogical for the court to draw
a distinction for unspecified minerals and extend the doctrine to such applications.
153. Where uranium could not be extracted by a solution process because of some inherent quality
of the formation or other technical difficulty, the theory behind Justice Daniel's dissent in Sun Oil
Co. v. Whitaker could be activated. See supra note 13. Under that theory, the mineral owner's
implied easement would not extend to extraordinary or secondary recovery methods, and, as a
consequence of the development of the in-situ approach, strip or pit mining techniques could be
considered extraordinary methods for the extraction of uranium. This theory has not been accepted
by the court, but it is not unreasonable and the situation described above would provide an appropriate
application for it.
154. Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 103; see supra note I1 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 94. It has been suggested that the means of extraction should be the determinative factor in the allocation of unnamed minerals to the surface or mineral estate. See Reed I1,
597 S.W.2d at 751 (Spears, J. concurring).
156. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 107.
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may underlie the provision. It also represents progress toward the internalization of the costs of extracting the unnamed substance.' 8 The primary
difficulty of the provision lies in its application. Determination of the
amount of damages suffered by individual tracts must be performed on
a tract-by-tract basis. Unlike the damage determinations inherent in the
Acker-Reed approach, the determinations are not speculative; compensation is based on damages actually incurred.' 5 9 Nevertheless, tract-bytract determinations are still required. These factual determinations may
be far more simple than those required under Reed II, 60 but they at least
partially undermine the efficiency of the court's rule.
In its present form, the court's damage provision may provide the
surface owner with an economic equivalent of the reasonable enjoyment
of his or her surface estate. By awarding the access to the underlying
minerals to the mineral estate and granting a damage remedy to the surface
estate, the court has reached a result much closer to the approach advocated by Professor Kuntz. 6' Assuming that the parties intended to sever
all valuable minerals from the mineral estate, the new scheme gives effect
to the parties "general intent."' 6 2 Moser thereby gives effect to what the
court perceived that the original parties to the conveyance would have
intended.
Unlike the court's earlier decisions, the analysis of Moser breaks the
ownership of near surface minerals into two distinct issues. Rather than
separating the issue of the protection of the surface from the issue of who
owned the disputed substance, prior decisions made the latter depend on
the first. This former approach invariably compromised one or the other
objective.' 63 The Moser analysis divides the two issues. While the rules
of Moser will accomplish the court's first goal of granting valuable minerals to the mineral estate, it may fall short of fully protecting the interest
158. Although the court's rule may internalize costs, it may not be an efficient means of doing
so. See infra notes 164-68 and accompanying text. One commentator has argued that, if a court
believes the parties have no intention sufficient to resolve the issue of the disputed ownership to
minerals, it should give all of the disputed minerals to the surface owner. See Note, supra note 35,
at 112-18. To do so would deprive the mineral owner of nothing he had bargained for; to fail to do
so would externalize costs of mining in a way that is unfair and economically unjustified. Id. This
writer believes that the surface entitlement is the key issue, and that the mineral entitlement itself
will not affect the internalization of costs; therefore, this article concentrates on the transfer of the
surface entitlement.
159. Naturally, the possibility of ex post disputes may motivate the mineral devloper to seek an
ex ante agreement with the surface owner. But see infra note 169 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 39.
162. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
163. Where the mineral was awarded to the mineral estate, the surface owner was not compensated
for any ensuing destruction of the surface. Where the substance was awarded to the surface estate,
the mineral estate owner was not compensated for the valuable minerals which he or she was not
allowed to extract.
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of the surface owner. Aside from the cost of determining the amount of
damages, there is a substantial possibility that the compensation to the
surface owner will be deficient. The mineral estate owner's bargaining
position is far superior to that of the surface estate owner. Although the
allocation of a damage remedy to the surface owner is to be commended,
it still leaves the mineral estate owner with property entitlements to both
the mineral and the relevant surface. This imbalance in the relative positions of the two parties may, as a practical matter, prevent the surface
owner from receiving the full economic equivalent of his surface interest* Furthermore, any undercompensation to the surface owner may
result in socially undesirable externalities and allocative inefficiencies.
The imbalance is particularly striking when one considers that the substance awarded to the mineral estate may often be a substance for which
the parties did not bargain.
The court formulated the Moser rule under the belief that the dominant
mineral owner's right to the reasonable and necessary use of the surface
was an "imperative rule of mineral law."' 65 But the entitlement is hardly
"imperative" in the normal sense of the word." If the complete surface
entitlement was allocated to the surface estate, the surface and mineral
owners would probably bargain over the mining of the substance. Where
profit is to be made from extraction, there is no reason to assume that
the mineral owner would be the only party interested in that profit. 67
Instances where the competing interests would fail to reach a bargain
164. Even if the market value of the easement is readily determinable, the surface owner's
compensation may remain inadequate. As Professors Calabresi and Melamed have explained:
Liability rules represent only an approximation of the value of the object to its
original owner and willingness to pay such an approximate value is no indication
that it is worth more to the [mineral owner] than the [surface owner]. In other words,
quite apart from the expense of arriving collectively at such an objective valuation,
it is no guarantee of the economic efficiency of the transfer.
Calabresi & Melamed, PropertyRules, LiabilityRules, and Inalienability:One View ofthe Cathedral,
85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1125 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
165. Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 103.
166. The Texas legislature has recognized that access to minerals is not imperative where the
surface will present special reclamation problems. Cf. Texas Uranium Surface Mining and Reclamation Act, Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. §§ 131.038-.039 (Vernon 1978). Legislation in several states
now requires the explicit consent of the surface owner before the surface may be destroyed by the
mineral owner. See generally Dycus, Legislative Clarificationof the CorrelativeRights of Surface
and Mineral Owners, 33 VAND. L. REv. 871 (1980) (discussing the various acts and proposing a
comprehensive model act).
167. The facts of Moser illustrate this point. After a new road left a 6.77 acre tract of one owner
separated from the remainder of his land and a 6.42 acre tract separated from another owner's land
(each property being across the road from the other), the two owners exchanged their surface rights
in order to retain contiguous surface estates. The mineral rights to both tracts were, however, reserved
to the original owners. The Mosers granted the right to mine uranium under the 6.42 acre tract, the
tract under which they owned the mineral rights. But the Mosers, as surface owners of the 6.77
acre tract at issue in this case, also sued the owners of title to the mineral rights of the 6.77 acres
in order to quiet title to the uranium in that tract as well. 601 S.W.2d at 731-32.
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would probably be exceptional, but the mineral owner could be given a
damage remedy as compensation if he or she was unreasonably 6 excluded
from extracting and enjoying the fruits of his or her property.' 1
The transfer of the surface entitlement to the surface owner may produce
some redistribution of the profits of the mining activity to the owner of
the surface estate. Nevertheless, the transfer would hardly be inequitable.
Such a redistribution and division of the profits might even provide a
more equitable solution. Since the allocation of the controverted substance, uranium, and the access to the substance, the surface easement,
are made on the assumption that the entitlements were not conveyed as
part of a bargain, 69 it might be more equitable to give one of the two
entitlements to the surface owner. Such a measure would somewhat balance the bargaining positions of the two interests, thus avoiding the
allocation of the entire windfall to only one of the two parties. Granting
the entitlement to the surface owner would also help to ensure that the
surface owner would receive at least enough of a recovery to compensate
for loss of surface enjoyment. Assuming that the parties did not bargain
for the allocation of a particular substance, and that the award of it to
the mineral owner represents a windfall, then such special precautions
may be warranted to assure that part of the costs associated with the
windfall do not fall upon other parties, i.e., parties such as the surface
owner. 7 ' The suggested rule would help to make sure that the costs of
extracting an "other mineral" would be internalized.
The suggested rule could also reduce overall transaction costs. The
mutual profit incentive provides a more compelling reason for ex ante
bargaining, thereby avoiding many of the factual entanglements which
might ensue from the ex post assessment of damages suggested by the
Moser rule.' 7' By shifting the surface entitlement to the surface estate,
the rule improves the efficiency and the fairness of its allocation of "other
minerals." The modification would move the test one step closer to matching the theme of the court's efforts to accommodate the "general intent"
of the parties to the transaction.
Moser presents a significant departure from the factual complexities of
the Acker-Reed approach, yet, despite these factual simplifications, it is
168. The objective underlying such a rearrangement of entitlements would be to assign the relevant
entitlements in a manner which would promote economic efficiency, distributional preferences, and
other justice considerations. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 164.
169. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
170. See Note, supra note 35, at 112-18.
171. Under Moser, the expectation of ex post disputes over the dollar amount of damages should
motivate those interested in developing minerals to seek an ex ante agreement for the amount to be
paid to the surface owner. Nevertheless, by giving entitlements to the owners of both competing
estates, the two parties would have a greater incentive to reach an agreement. Both parties would
have a profit incentive.
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not evident that the court's original objectives have been compromised.
The rule may still be used to effectuate "the intent of the parties to convey
valuable minerals to the mineral estate owner, while protecting the surface
estate owner from destruction of the surface estate by the minerals owner's
extraction of minerals." 17 2 Although the protection afforded the surface
owner is presented in the form of damages, this form of protection may
be adequate in many instances. Nevertheless, there exists a potential for
inadequate surface protection. It is a weakness which stems from the
court's reluctance to sever the title to the mineral from the access to it.
By carrying its analysis one step further and severing these two interests,
the court may move even closer to its original goal without compromising
the clarity of its new rule. The modificiation would not only enhance the
efficiency and certainty of the rule-it would add an element of fairness
as well.
CONCLUSION
The Moser decision presents a potential for clarity that is unmatched
by its predecessors. Rather than leaving the determination of mineral
ownership to the vagaries of the surface destruction test, the court has
determined the ownership of certain "other minerals" by law. The court
has also attempted to assure that parties who receive the title and ensuing
benefits from a mineral bear the associated costs. In those instances where
substances have been allocated to the mineral estate, the court has provided economic protection to the surface owner. Assuming that the parties
had no specific intent to allocate a substance to one party or the other,
then the expectations of neither of the two will suffer as long as the
surface owner is adequately compensated. Shifting a greater entitlement
to the surface owner would reduce the administrative complexity of the
new rule and enhance its equitable aspects, but whether the damaged
surface owner will be adequately compensated is only one of several
issues left open by the Moser decision. The decision conclusively declares
that uranium belongs to any mineral estate severed by a conveyance of
"oil, gas and other minerals" after June 8, 1983. Exactly what other
substances or conveyances the opinion will apply to is difficult to ascertain. Several aspects of the rule warrant further definition and refinement.
Nevertheless, the opinion signals a significant move toward a reliable
and workable means of determining the ownership of "other minerals"
in Texas.

172. Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 101.

